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HUMAN CREATIVITY FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: PATENTS PROPEL 
TECHNOLOGY* 
 
by 
 
Robert M. Sherwood** 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Intellectual property both leads and lags the development of new technology.  It 
lags in the sense that developments usually precede the law.  Today science is 
accelerating so rapidly that the lawyers and policy analysts can barely grasp what the 
new questions are, much less supply answers.  How are we to adapt the historic forms 
of protection to deal with new things like patents for genetically modified life forms, or 
for the Internet?  Yet, this process of adaptation is not new.  There was a time when 
maps were all the rage in Europe and judges puzzled over how much difference was 
needed to distinguish one map from the next.  In the early years of this country, nails 
were at the leading edge of our technology.  Several hundred patent applications for 
assorted types of nails put a strain on out patent system.  All nails are not alike, as it 
turned out.  At any event, intellectual property rules often lag behind the advent of new 
kinds of technology. 
 
To explain the sense in which intellectual property leads the development of 
new technology, I want to draw on an excellent paper written by Kenneth Dam, which 
he entitled The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law.1 
 
The starting point of his paper is that an intellectual property system is, in 
effect, a passive industrial policy.  The policy has served well to stimulate innovation 
without requiring affirmative government action or public funds.  Rather than rely on 
bureaucrats to pick winners, that is, to determine which prospective technologies 
deserve public support, this passive system offers researchers, and the private investors 
who would back them, the prospect of carefully defined property rights as incentive for 
their decisions. 
 
My own career has centered chiefly in developing countries, many of them in 
                                                 
*Address presented October 12, 1999, on the occasion of the investiture of Dr. Luiz Proenza 
as the 15th president of the University of Akron.  Copyright 1999, Robert M. Sherwood. 
**Robert M. Sherwood, a private consultant and author, is researching the role of intellectual 
property in developing countries.  He has also launched measurement of the effect of judicial 
system performance on economic growth in both developing and developed countries. 
1Kenneth Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23 J. Legal Stud., 247, 271 
(1994). 
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Latin America.  This has given me a particular perspective on the connection of 
intellectual property with economic development.  I want to offer three observations 
from that perspective.  First, creative minds are found in every country and they are a 
potent national resource.  Second, the origins of intellectual property indicate its role in 
fostering development.  Third, the economic literature, while sending mixed signals at 
times, points to an important role for intellectual property in economic development. 
 
II.  CREATIVE MINDS 
 
I have spent significant time in about 25 developing countries during my career, 
and I’ve come to realize that throughout the world, in every country, in even the 
poorest, there are people with the capacity to invent and create, some at a world-class 
level.  I’ve met some of them.  It has repeatedly struck me that they are a vital natural 
resource for these countries.  Whether this resource is mobilized for national economic 
development, or wasted, is largely a function of the availability of protection for the 
intellectual property they create. 
 
When I visited Managua, Nicaragua, for the Inter-American Development Bank 
several years ago, I learned about the “melon saver”.  A farmer there had just made this 
invention.  It’s a small cheap plastic platform that looks like an over-sized golf tee with 
extra legs for stability.  It’s placed under melons as they ripen in the fields to prevent 
rot and improve crop yields.  The fellow obtained a patent in Nicaragua and in the 
United States.  That gave him the impetus to mass produce the little stands and offer 
them to melon farmers.  A marvelous invention that emerged from a very poor country. 
 
This is a success story, but one of the few.  There are abundant examples of 
creative individuals in developing countries who have made inventions only to fail in 
their efforts to bring them to commercial usefulness because of the weak intellectual 
property system of their country. 
 
One telling example involves an invention by Flavio Alterthum, a Brazilian 
professor, and two American academics.  Working at the University of Florida at 
Gainesville, they invented a genetically altered microbe which digests the bio-waste of 
the sugar harvest to efficiently produce ethanol.  The U.S. Patent Office awarded the 
invention United States Patent 5,000,000.2  Patents were eventually obtained in five 
other large sugar producing countries, but not in Brazil, where such inventions were not 
patentable at that time.  Commercial development of the invention is progressing in the 
United States and elsewhere, but not in Brazil, where this new technology could bring 
substantial benefits.  The Brazilian co-inventor returned to Brazil and attempted to 
interest local sugar companies in development of the process, but in the absence of 
local patent protection at the time he got no response. 
                                                 
2Ethanol production by Escherichia coli strains co-expressing Zymomonas PDC and ADH 
genes, issued March 19, 1991, available at <http://www.uspto.gov/patft/index.html>. 
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In another example from Ecuador, a small firm had been exporting cut flowers 
to markets in North America and Europe.  The firm owners saw an opportunity to 
produce a new type of exportable flower though genetic modification of an existing 
plant that grew well in Ecuador.  Just as the first field-grown test crop of the new 
plants was ready for harvesting, seventy plants were stolen.  I happened to visit them 
the morning after the theft was discovered.  Without any effective means under the 
then-existing Ecuadorean patent system to go after the thieves and stop their 
infringement of the invention, the firm had to consider abandoning Ecuador.  One of 
Ecuador’s growing export industries suffered a severe and unnecessary blow. 
 
Three years ago, I visited the University of Costa Rica to talk with Edgar Arias, 
the director of university technology transfer.  His position was new.  In his first 18 
months he surveyed the campus and found about 600 research projects in science and 
technology, from which about 30 inventions had been made with commercial potential. 
 One was a molecule showing promise in HIV suppression.  Already four private firms 
had approached the university for a license.  The other was identification of the gene 
which hosts a virulent blight in tropical corn.  Dr. Arias told me he had considered 
obtaining patents but learned patent protection in Costa Rica is so weak he could not 
justify using university funds to apply for patents.  Instead, he disclosed the HIV 
invention to a Canadian institute, and he sent the investigator who identified the corn 
gene to Monterrey, Mexico, to disclose his findings to researchers there.  In both cases, 
the value added would be done outside Costa Rica, even though individuals capable of 
advancing the inventions were available on campus or in local firms. 
 
I’ve gathered over a hundred similar examples over the last fifteen years.  They 
illustrate the presence of inventive people in every country.  They also point to the 
losses suffered by those creative individuals, and to the losses suffered by the countries 
themselves - usually unnoticed opportunity losses - which stem from ineffective 
intellectual property systems. 
 
III.  ORIGINS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
 
The history of intellectual property is essentially the emergence of recognition 
that a community benefits when it encourages its creative and inventive people by 
honoring the products of their minds. 
 
Intellectual property was not invented by the United States.  We have refined 
many of its concepts, but it is quite ancient.  Over two thousand years ago, in the 
Middle East, where water is precious, villages found some of their potters produced 
exceptionally useful water jugs.  Their jugs conserved water better than others.  The 
villagers determined to honor the marks the potters placed on their jugs to make sure 
inferior jug makers would not deceive the villagers. 
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When I visited Islamabad in 1994, the president of the local chamber of 
commerce listened to my presentation for a while, then interrupted to tell me he was a 
rug maker.  His family had been in the rug business for hundreds of years.  He wasn’t 
sure how long.  The key to the family’s success was an incredible blue dye, the 
hallmark of their rugs.  He told me that they produced the color from a rare root.  As I 
recall, only he and one of his sons knew the secret of when to harvest the roots, where 
to find them in a remote mountain area, and how to prepare them to produce the blue 
dye.  He went on to assure me it is well known in his area that if anyone were to steal 
the secret, his family will have them killed.  Trade secret protection today, after all, 
remains grounded on the concept that all reasonable precautions under the 
circumstances must be taken to preserve the secret. 
 
Copyright protection arose after moveable type was invented in response to 
that new technology.  Patent concepts germinated in the northern Italian city-states 
under fascinating circumstances. 
 
Let me suggest that at each stage in the historical development of intellectual 
property we see that a community - whether a village, a city, or a nation - decided to 
give encouragement to its creative and inventive people because the entire community 
would benefit from the technology they produced. 
 
IV.  ECONOMIC THEORY 
 
In 1989, Prof. Edwin Mansfield, a well-regarded economist at the University of 
Pennsylvania, who knew I had been spending considerable time in Brazil and Mexico 
investigating the role of intellectual property there, urged me to write a book to report 
what I’d learned. 
 
As I began to write, it occurred to me that I should check to see what the 
economic literature had to say about intellectual property and economic development.  I 
found very little directly relevant to the situation in developing countries.  There was 
theory, much of it generated in the aftermath of World War II when American industry 
dominated the world.  Edith Penrose3 and others seemed to dislike patents because they 
perceived them as monopolies.  Raul Prebisch, an influential Argentine economist, 
preached that patents were an insidious tool by which the poor countries at the 
“periphery” were rendered dependent on the rich countries of the “center”.4  Some of 
                                                 
3See, EDITH PENROSE, THE ECONOMICS OF THE INTERNATIONAL PATENT SYSTEM, (1951); F. 
Machlup, An Economic Review of the Patent System, Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks 
and Copyrights, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, 85th Cong., 2nd Sess., (1958). 
4See Paul Prebisch, Five Stages in My Thinking on Development, in PIONEERS IN 
DEVELOPMENT, Meier, Gerald and Dudley Seers, eds.  For one of his final statements, which 
revealed he had shifted his analysis, see his Address to the Twenty-First Session of ECLAC, 
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the mainstream American academic economists had become fascinated with questions 
of appropriability in relation to patents, but had not really addressed the broader question 
of the role of intellectual property in developing countries. 
 
To this day, there are still few empirical studies that help us understand what 
will happen when a developing country adopts robust intellectual property protection.  
Among the few are two careful studies done be Professor Mansfield for the World 
Bank in 1994 and 1995.5 
 
A.  Solow, Schumpeter and Mansfield 
 
To produce a chapter on economic theory in my book, I traced two streams of 
literature, one initiated by Robert Solow and Joseph Schumpeter, the other by Professor 
Mansfield.  Some of you may be familiar with Solow’s 1957 Study of the production 
function.6  He reviewed the American economy from 1909 to 1949 and found that the 
three classic factors of production - money, labor,  and natural resources - accounted 
for barely half of our nation’s economy over that period.  There was an unexpectedly 
sizeable “residual” which required further explanation.  This was identified as the 
introduction of new technology into the economy.  My gloss on this is that much of the 
new technology had come from patented inventions. 
 
Some years before Solow’s essay, Joseph Schumpeter, a refugee economist 
from Eastern Europe, propounded his view of the displacement of mature industries by 
newer ones as a seminal force in economic development.7  Again, the insertion of new 
technology was perceived as a driving economic force. 
 
Mansfield followed Solow by investigating the social welfare gains from new 
technology.  In a series of studies, he and colleagues measured welfare benefits gained 
from the introduction of new technology into the American economy.8  He showed high 
rates of public return to investment in scientific and technical research. 
                                                                                                                         
Mexico City, April 17-25, 1986 published as Annex II of the Report of the 21st Session, United 
Nations document LC/G, 1424 (Ses. 21/30), June 9, 1986. 
5Edwin Mansfield, Intellectual Property Protection, Foreign Direct Investment, and 
Technology Transfer: Germany, Japan, and the United States, Discussion Paper 27 (1995), 
both from the International Finance Corporation of the World Bank Group. 
6Robert Solow, Technical Change and Aggregate Production Function, Rev. Econ. & Statis., 
(1957). 
7JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, BUSINESS CYCLES: A THEORETICAL, HISTORICAL AND STATISTICAL 
ANALYSIS OF THE CAPITALIST PROCESS, (1939).  Appreciations of his work appear throughout 
GIOVANNI DOSI, ET AL., TECHNICAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC THEORY, (eds. 1988). 
8For entry to this literature, see Edwin Mansfield, et al, Social and Private Rates of Return 
from Industrial Innovations, Quarterly J. Econ., (1977). 
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In 1987, Mansfield was invited to address a conference in Washington on the 
subject of intellectual property.  He theorized that by increasing the private rate of return 
to investment in research through strengthened intellectual property protection, the 
public welfare benefit would rise as well.9  He was shy about predicting the effect in 
developing countries, however, where he had little experience. 
 
I am less shy about predicting a positive effect, possibly a strongly positive 
effect.  I can think of no important reason why transporting the insights of these three 
men to the developing countries would not lead to forecasts of similar results. 
 
B.  Knowledge Matters 
 
Quite recently, another stream of economic analysis has emerged which is 
relevant to this topic.  The World Development Report, the annual policy analysis 
produced by the World Bank, issued for 1998/99 focused on knowledge for 
development.10  It asserts that “knowledge matters,” that knowledge itself has intrinsic 
economic value. 
 
From this report we gain a sense that knowledge itself is increasing in 
importance, or, more precisely, that awareness of its importance is increasing.  It is 
also argued that the size of our body of knowledge is increasing swiftly and that this 
enhances its importance. 
 
At one point [page 16] the report states: 
 
For countries in the vanguard of the world economy, the balance 
between knowledge and resources has shifted so far toward the 
former that knowledge has become perhaps the most important factor 
determining the standard of living - more than land, than tools, than 
labor.  Today’s most technologically advanced economies are truly 
knowledge-based.  And as they generate new wealth from their 
innovations, they are creating millions of knowledge-related jobs in an 
array of disciplines that have emerged overnight. . . . 
 
Curiously, a proposed chapter on intellectual property was prepared for the Bank’s 
report but suppressed at the executive board level under pressure from several 
developing countries.  Fortunately, the suppressed chapter will appear soon as a 
                                                 
9Edwin Mansfield, Technical Change and Economic Growth, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS AND CAPITAL FORMATION IN THE NEXT DECADE, (Walker eds., 1998). 
10World Bank, World Development Report 1988/99: Knowledge for Development, available 
at <http://www.worldbank.org/wdr/wdr98/contents.htm>. 
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separate Bank publication.11 
 
I think it is clear that in many developed countries, solid intellectual property 
protection has helped to expand the generation and spread of knowledge.  The type of 
knowledge fostered by intellectual property protection has a particularly high capacity to 
improve products and processes, create new kinds of technology, and launch new 
industries.  Today, major new industries spring from micro-firms and student rooms in 
many corners of the world.  In this context, the role of intellectual property grows in 
importance. 
 
The Wall Street Journal recently carried an article which sought to explain why 
apparently overvalued stocks are not overvalued.12  It noted that the assets carried on a 
company’s books give little hint of the company’s ability to generate new technology.  
The costs of generating new technology are washed out of the books as current 
expenses rather than carried as depreciable assets. Beyond this,  “goodwill” is a poor 
reflection of the intellectual property values generated by research.  Indeed, the 
valuation of intellectual property, while getting more sophisticated, is still an immature 
art.  The article concludes that the market is apparently smarter than the traditional 
approach to valuation based on book assets, having discovered that the ability to 
generate new technology is what gives companies their real value. 
 
C.  A Tantalizing Hypothesis 
 
Drawing from the work of Solow, Schumpeter and Mansfield, and the World 
Bank’s new emphasis on knowledge, I have gained confidence that it is valid to 
hypothesize that improved intellectual property protection in the developing countries 
will boost the creation and application of new technology, as it has in the developed 
countries, with consequent economic growth and increased public welfare benefit. 
 
However, there is a major limitation to empirically testing this hypothesis.  Only 
two major developing countries - Mexico and South Korea - have thus far made 
improvements to their intellectual property systems which in my view are substantial 
enough to warrant extensive empirical research. 
 
Mexico is probably the leading candidate.  Already anecdotal information 
suggests noticeable shifts in activity patterns in Mexico which can probably be traced to 
                                                 
11A positive appraisal of the role of intellectual property in development appears, 
nonetheless, at page 17 of the 1998/99 World Development Report.  The background paper 
will appear under the authorship of Carlos Primo Braga and Carsten Fink. 
12Greg Ip. New Paradigm’ View For Stocks is Bolstered, The Wall Street Journal, October 4, 
1999, at C1.  The article comments on a paper by Leonard Nakamura, economic advisor at the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. 
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the higher levels of protection introduced in 1991 and 1994.  For example, some major 
companies are now conducting internal research.  The research results from 
universities beginning to find their way to the marketplace.  Start-up companies are 
beginning to attract private venture capital.  More technology is moving from one entity 
to another.  I think these will be key when applying the litmus tests when discerning 
whether intellectual property protection is starting to do its job there and elsewhere. 
 
Different things happen at different levels of intellectual property protection.  
Based largely on my work for the Inter-American Development Bank between 1992 and 
1996, I developed a numerical rating system for assessing and comparing intellectual 
property regimes.13  It examines, from the perspective of a private investor, the main 
components of an intellectual property regime, namely:  the laws and treaties which 
create the rights, the public office which grants or registers the rights, and the judicial 
system’s ability to enforce the rights.  So far I’ve applied this rating system to the 
regimes of 18 countries, most of them in Latin America.  On a scale of 100, 
Guatemala’s regime, for example, rated a 13, Argentina a 39, Brazil 49, Chile 62, 
Mexico 69, and South Korea 74. 
 
These ratings are useful insofar as they tell us something about what is likely to 
happen at various levels of protection.  At the lower levels, the economy will be 
characterized by sales and distribution, parts manufacture, and assembly operation.  
These activities contribute to economic development, to be sure.  But only at higher 
levels of protection would we begin to see complete manufacturing of sophisticated 
products.  More important, it is only at the upper levels of protection that research and 
development will be supported by private investors.  That is the level at which those 
creative and inventive local people become such a valuable natural resource. 
 
Someone will say, but these are poor countries.  They can’t afford money for 
research.  When I visited Cuenca, a lovely Ecuadorean city up in the Andes, I talked 
with a small group of company owners from the textile and ceramics industries.  I 
asked them if they ever made inventions.  They all said they did, but only occasionally, 
and only in response to a problem.  I asked what happened then.  They all said that their 
better inventions were copied by their competitors.  So I asked how their activities 
would change if they believed they could effectively protect their inventions from 
copying by others.  Each man stated he would eagerly devote his own time and his 
company’s resources to systematic research to develop better techniques and new and 
better products.  It is difficult to calculate Ecuador’s loss for not giving these men this 
incentive, but it is probably substantial. 
 
When I listen to discussions about intellectual property in developing countries, 
                                                 
13Robert M. Sherwood, Intellectual Property Systems and Investment Stimulation: The 
Rating of Systems in Eighteen Developing Countries, 37 IDEA: The J. Law and Tech. 261, 
261-370 (1997).  Also available from <http://www.kreative.net/ipbenefits>. 
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I often hear debaters focusing almost exclusively on pharmaceutical patents.  I grimace 
because that is only the tip of the iceberg.  A robust intellectual property system 
facilitates far more useful activity than most people realize.14 
 
Consider, for example, the trade secret.  It’s an orphan.  Judges support it, but 
it has no fan club.  No bureaucracy serves it.  No lawyers association thrives on it.  Yet 
the trade secret is the grease that makes intellectual property work.  Before an invention 
is a patent, it’s a trade secret.  As a raw invention is groomed for the market place, 
incremental improvements are usually held in secret.  Before companies make deals of 
all kinds - whether in-sourcing, out-sourcing, or joint venturing - they typically rely on 
trade secret protection to check each other out.  The trade secret plays a critical role at 
most stages in the life-cycle of many products and processes.  All of this leads me to 
assert that without effective intellectual property protection, developing countries suffer 
many losses of which they are never aware. 
 
V.  THREE OBSTACLES 
 
Before I finish, let me mention three obstacles to a happy ending.  We might 
like to suppose that once enough leaders in developing countries grasp the case I have 
been laying out for you here, they will act to improve their intellectual property systems 
and realize the predicted benefits.  A few officials have done so, particularly in Mexico, 
Brazil and Ecuador.  But the happy outcome remains in jeopardy.  The obstacles come 
in three flavors: (1) weak judicial system performance, (2) an absurdly archaic world 
patent system, and (3) confusion which results from linking intellectual property 
protection to global trade negotiations. 
 
A.  Judicial System Weakness 
 
In perhaps 80% of the countries of the world today, the judicial system is not 
up to the sophisticated task of enforcing intellectual property rights, or indeed, to many 
other tasks.  Most of these countries are not likely to upgrade their judicial systems for 
the sake of intellectual property, at least not any time soon.15 
                                                 
14In this regard, see Keith E. Maskus, Intellectual Property Rights in the Global Economy  
[provisional title], commissioned by the Institute for International economics, forthcoming.  
See also  ROBERT M. SHERWOOD, Intellectual Property and Economic Development, (1990), 
(out of print), but available from <http://www.kreative.net/ipbenefits>. 
15While members of the World Trade Organization have committed themselves to comply with 
the TRIPS Agreement which sets minimum requirements for intellectual property protection, 
and while TRIPS, in Articles 41 to 61 sets forth an elaborate blueprint for the enforcement of 
intellectual property rights, Article 41(5) recognizes that countries may not be able to enact 
that blueprint, stating that member countries need not provide more institutional resources 
than they already do to upgrade judicial system performance and need not create special 
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There are partial remedies which may help to notch up judicial performance.  
One is to provide special training for judges who handle intellectual property cases.  
Another is to give judges adequate authority to deal swiftly and effectively with threats 
to these rights.  A third might be the creation of specialized intellectual property courts, 
although I have backed away from this suggestion, and now recommend docket 
management as practiced in Australia.16 
 
However, the basic need is to upgrade judicial system performance in general.  
To this end, two economist friends of mine and I wrote a paper in 1993 titled “Judicial 
Systems and Economic Performance.”17  In it we called for measurement of the 
economic damage done to national economies by judicial dysfunction.  This broke new 
ground and spawned several major workshops.  Thus far, nine grants have been 
awarded to take up the challenge of our paper.  Already research has found that in 
Brazil the national rate of economic growth is reduced 20%, and the credit supply is 
lessened about 10%, as the result of judicial inefficiency.  In Peru, the numbers are 
worse.  In Spain, 86% of 500 surveyed companies stated they are rendered non-
competitive in the European market by poor judicial system performance.  Research is 
underway now in Argentina, Mexico and the Philippines, with second-generation 
projects being launched in Brazil and Spain.  Those of us involved hope there will 
eventually be a beneficial result, and not only for intellectual property.   
 
B.  Patent System Absurdities 
 
The second obstacle to a happy ending lurks in the world patent system.18  Its 
present form dates back to the 1880’s.  It features two absurdities.  First, just after an 
inventor makes an invention, the patent system requires substantial immediate payments 
to secure patent rights.  These patent-acquisition costs siphon off scarce funds urgently 
needed to prepare the raw invention for use.  Countless inventions have died at this 
point, particularly in developing countries where the weakness of the patent system 
discourages venture capital.  A better approach would be to reduce and postpone 
acquisition costs as much as possible.  
 
It is also absurd that every country imagines it must conduct a technical 
                                                                                                                         
arrangements for intellectual property matters. 
16Robert M. Sherwood, Specialized Judicial Arrangements for Intellectual Property, 36 
Revista da ABPI, (1998). 
17Robert M. Sherwood, et al. Judicial Systems and Economic Performance, The Quarterly 
Rev. of Econ. and Finance, Vol. 34, (1994).  A longer version appears at 
<http://www.kreative.net/ipbenefits.html>. 
18The discussion which follows is taken from Robert M. Sherwood, et al. Promotion of 
Inventiveness in Developing Countries Through a More Advanced Patent Administration 39 
IDEA: The J. Law and Tech. 473-506 (1999). 
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examination of patent applications to determine whether the claimed invention is new 
when measured against the world’s body of scientific and technical literature.  The 
redundancy is costly, particularly for inventors who ultimately pay for these multiple 
examinations.  A world patent is still some years off, but it would be quite feasible for 
developing countries to unilaterally decide to grant patents based on the results of a 
technical examination conducted, for example, at the European Patent Office.  The 
value of such patents would be considerably higher than those granted by most 
developing country patent offices today.  The interest of potential investors would 
increase. 
 
A sub-set of this proposal would create a searchable database for developing 
country patent applications which are not readily accessible currently.  A proposal is 
being prepared for submission to the World Bank covering Iberian-language patent 
applications.  Computer accessible applications would give inventors better means to 
plan their research, patent lawyers more ability to write better quality applications, and 
venture capitalists more inspiration to provide funds in the early stages of innovation. 
 
C.  Trade linkage = Confusion 
 
The third obstacle to a happy ending cropped up when trade and intellectual 
property were linked.  Many of you know that during the Uruguay Round of GATT 
trade negotiations, this linkage led to an international treaty known commonly as the 
TRIPS Agreement.  The current difficulty with the trade linkage is that developing 
countries are tending to withhold improved intellectual property as a bargaining chip, in 
the expectation that the chip can be used to negotiate for other trade concessions.  
From everything I can see, this is probably a mistake.  For most developing countries a 
higher level of IP protection today would probably do more to enhance their export 
potential than an uncertain trade negotiation outcome some years from now.19 
 
D.  Dr. Proenza’s Career 
 
I would like to finish with a reflection on Dr. Proenza’s career.  It shows 
remarkable achievement in securing grants to support university research in science.  
What role has intellectual property played in this achievement?  After all, a good portion 
of the funds which support university research comes from government and foundation 
sources.  The incentive of intellectual property protection would seem to play little 
direct part in this dynamic. 
 
In developing countries, it is typical for the funds applied to science and 
                                                 
19For an elaboration of this point, see Robert M. Sherwood, Intellectual Property: A Chip 
Withheld in Error, in COMPETITIVE STRATEGIES FOR THE PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY, (Owen eds. 1999). 
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technology to amount to less than 1% of GDP.  Of that amount, most is from 
government entities.  Local private firms spend almost nothing to advance technology 
through research, in large part because of the weakness of intellectual property 
protection.  Often the government funds are derived from the World Bank and other 
donor institutions. 
 
In 1997, the Brazilian government argued strenuously that a series of World 
Bank “jumbo” loans for science and technology should be continued.  Why?  Because 
the prior loans had produced a large number of theoretical scientific papers that were 
published in juried journals.  Unfortunately, however, no technology had been produced 
that led to improved industrial activity or boosted the economy.  When the Bank did 
grant the new loan at the end of 1997, it put Brazil on notice that from now on, useful 
technology will be expected, and funds were included to help enhance Brazil’s 
intellectual property system. 
 
While developing countries apply less than 1% of GDP to science and 
technology, the most advanced countries spend three to four times as much, with 80% 
of that typically coming from private sector sources.  I believe the availability of 
effective intellectual property protection in these countries accounts for this rather large 
difference. 
 
I would suggest that foundations and government agencies willingly provide 
funds to university scientific research in the context of the widespread commitment of 
private funds to research and development.  Foundation and government administrators 
and, indeed, the public in general understand that the research done in universities 
provides rich primary materials from which private companies develop economically 
useful technology, precisely the new technology which Solow and Schumpeter 
spotlighted for us four decades ago. 
 
At the beginning, I quoted Kenneth Dam.  He said the achievement of our 
patent system has been that private inventors and investors, not government officials, 
pick winners, assume the risks of failure, and - I would add - provide vast sums of 
capital in pursuit of inventions.  The American system today embodies a very practical 
and effective synergy between the grants which empower university contributions to 
science and technology, and the private risk capital which propels derivative technology 
in multiple new directions.  This model, I submit, is sustaining our economy - and has 
become the envy of the world. 
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